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TARPLEY v. KEISTLER: PATRONAGE, PETITION, AND
THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE*
INTRODUCTION
"Politics, n. A strife of interests masquerading as a contest of prin-
ciples. The conduct of public affairs for private advantage."' So goes
the pithy, if cynical, definition of politics given by Ambrose Bierce in
The Devil's Dictionary.2 Bierce's definition expresses the common-
place observation that political parties exist to advance their own in-
terests which may sometimes be adverse to the interests of others. So
long as the means remain lawful, political parties may enlist support
for their programs in any manner they consider advantageous.3 Politi-
cal patronage, that is, the bartering of votes for jobs and other favors,
has traditionally been one method that political parties have used to
advance their own interests.4 However, a political party's freedom to
advance its interests through patronage is not absolute. For example,
government actors, who are often political party loyalists, generally
may not hire or fire individuals based on a person's political affilia-
tions.5 This restriction is based upon an individual's First Amendment
freedom of political association and balances that freedom against a
* The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Mark Weber of DePaul
University College of Law for his many helpful comments and suggestions during the
preparation of this Note.
1. AMBROSE GWINETT BIERCE, DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 156 (1911).
2. Id.
3. Cynthia Grant Bowman, 'We Don't Want Anybody Sent': The Death of Patronage Hiring in
Chicago, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 57, 60 (1991). The arrangement is also known-as the "spoils system"
from the quip (by Nineteenth Century New York Governor Marcy), that "[t]o the victor belongs
the spoils of the enemy." Id. at 60 n.18 (citing M. TOLCHIN & S. TOLCHIN, TO THE VICTOR:
POLITICAL PATRONAGE FROM CLUBHOUSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE 319 (1971)).
4. See id. at 61. Finley Peter Dunne's fictitious Chicago bartender, Mr. Dooley, makes the
same point more colorfully in his description of an equally fictitious Chicago aldermanic candi-
date, "Flannigan."
[T]his here Flannigan had put a man on th' day watch, tol' him to speak gently to any
raygistered voter that wint to sleep behind th' sthove, an' was out that night visitin' his
frinds. Who was it judged th' cake walk? Flannigan. Who was it carrid th' pall? Flan-
nigan. Who was it sthud up at th' christening? Flannigan. Whose ca-ards did th'
grievin' widow, th' blushin' bridegroom, or th' happy father find in th' hack? Flanni-
gan's. Ye bet ye'er life. Ye see Flannigan wasn't out f'r th' good iv th' community.
Flannigan was out fir Flannigan an' th' stuff
FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY IN PEACE AND WAR 114-15 (NEW YORK, 1898) (emphasis
added). It should come as no surprise that "Flannigan" won that fictitious election. Id. at 116.
5. Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Law of Patronage at a Crossroads, 12 J.L. & POL. 341, 341-42
(1996).
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political party's interest in preferring members of its own party for
government employment. 6
Tarpley v. Keistler7 considers the closely related issue of whether a
private individual, who is also the officer of a local political party or-
ganization, may recommend the hiring of a party loyalist to a govern-
ment actor of the same party.8 The Tarpley decision frames this issue
in terms of balancing an individual's freedom of political association
against another individual's right of petition. 9 As is often required in
First Amendment jurisprudence, the Tarpley decision weighs compet-
ing interests. 10 Tarpley holds that a private individual employed by a
political party organization may directly advocate the hiring of party
loyalists to government positions as an exercise of the right of peti-
tion. I I To achieve this result, the Tarpley decision applies the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine to a section 198312 action. 13 The decision holds
that by protecting the right of petition as a component part of associa-
6. Id. at 354. This is extensively developed in poitical speech cases.
7. 188 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 1999).
8. Id. at 789-91. Tarpley was alleging a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of
political association pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2983. Id. at 790.
9. Id. at 795.
10. The balance referred to corresponds to Professor Laurence Tribe's "track two" analysis. If
a government regulation is aimed at the non-communicative impact of the act, the courts will
balance freedom of expression against the government's regulatory interests on a case by case
basis. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 792-93 (2d ed. 1988). As Pro-
fessor Tribe notes, "[ilt is impossible to escape the task of weighing the competing considera-
tions. One example of this problem is often seen in the 'overlap' between the free exercise of
the religion clause and the establishment clause." Id. at 1156-57. Another example occurs in
balancing the freedom of speech against what are generally termed "time, place, and manner"
restrictions. This goes to the distinction between speech and conduct, which Professor Tribe
finds less helpful because "[a]ll communication except perhaps that of the extrasensory variety
involves conduct." Id. at 827. Professor Tribe traces the origin of the concept to Justice Doug-
las' concurring opinion in Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775-77 (1942). Id. at 826
n.4. The concept gained a more complete expression in Teamsters Union v. Vogt Inc., 354 U.S.
284 (1957). There Justice Frankfurter found that picketing, which was the issue of the case, was
*speech plus" and that the state could regulate the "plus." TRIBE, at 826 (discussing Vogt). In
Cox v. Louisiana, Justice Goldberg adumbrated what Professor Tribe describes as the "fullest
statement" of the "speech plus" problem. 379 U.S. 559, 564-66 (1965). In that decision the
Court held that demonstrators peacefully gathering outside the Baton Rouge, Louisiana jail to
protest segregation and the arrest of students for picketing stores with segregated lunch counters
was "speech plus" and thus entitled to less protection than "pure speech." Id. at 568-75. (dis-
cussing Louisiana v. Cox, 379 U.S. 559 (1965)). However, "[e]xpression and conduct, message
and medium, are thus inextricably tied together in all communicative behavior; expressive be-
havior is '100% action and 100% expression."' TRIBE, at 827 (citing John Hart Ely, Flag Dese-
cration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495-96 (1975)). Professor Tribe's analysis also has implications for the
right of petition, as we shall see. See infra notes 365-78 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 7, at 795-96.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983, which is a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
allows petitioners a cause of action for conspiracies intended to deprive them of their civil rights.
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tional rights in general, the right of political association is more se-
curely preserved.1 4 The significance of Tarpley v. Keistler lies not only
in its extension of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to section 1983 ac-
tions and to one particular form of political patronage, but also in its
recognition of the unique value of the right of petition.'5
Part I of this Note will consider the background of the Tarpley deci-
sion in the following order.1 6 First, a general review of the history of
political patronage in Illinois will be followed by a discussion of a line
of cases restricting the authority of the government to hire or fire em-
ployees on the basis of their political affiliations.1 7 Second, a brief
review of the incorporation of the right of petition into the Bill of
Rights and discussion of several Nineteenth and Twentieth Century
cases that have interpreted the right of petition.'8 Finally, an analysis
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, together with a description of the
cases that have extended the doctrine beyond the context of antitrust
law where it originated. 19 Part II will review the subject opinion in
depth20 and Part III will analyze the Tarpley decision's recognition
that the right of petition strengthens the other enumerated First
Amendment rights of speech, press, and assembly by safeguarding the
right to seek action from that part of the government most competent
to provide redress. 2t Part IV will consider the potential impact of
Id. A state actor for purposes of section 1983 need not be an employee of the state. See also
infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
13. 188 F.3d at 791. State action is not limited to the conduct of state officials; the conduct of
private parties can, under certain circumstances, constitute state action.
14. See supra note 7, at 794-95.
In every free and deliberating society there must, from the nature of man, be opposite
parties and violent dissentions and discords; and one of these must prevail over the
other for a longer or shorter time. Perhaps this party division is necessary to induce
each to watch and relate to the people the proceedings of the other.
DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 116-17 (1994).
(Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, June 4, 1798).
15. The First Amendment does not enumerate a specific "freedom of association," as it does
speech, press, petition, or assembly. See TRIBE, supra note 10, at 702, The Supreme Court has
recognized that implicit in the First Amendment (and in the liberties secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment) a right of association to pursue goals that the First Amendment protects indepen-
dently; political advocacy is one such example. Id. at 703. Thus, the issue in Tarpley focuses on
how to balance the enumerated right of petition to pursue political association against the free-
dom of association to join (and not be penalized for joining) a political party.
16. See infra notes 23-267 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 24-102 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 102-161 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 162-265 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 268-325 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 326-402 and accompanying text.
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Tarpley.22 Finally, this Note will conclude that Tarpley appropriately
advances and protects the right of petition.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Political Patronage in Illinois
Illinois has a rich history of political patronage, in large measure
due to the contributions of the City of Chicago.23 Consequently,
many of the landmark cases defining the scope of political patronage
have originated in Illinois. 24 The benefits of political patronage in
Chicago and elsewhere are debatable. Justice Scalia, for example, in
his dissenting opinion in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,25 ar-
gued that political patronage is not only constitutional, but an accept-
able basis for political hiring.26 Although disclaiming an endorsement
of the practice, Justice Scalia observed that a legislature could reason-
ably determine that the benefits of patronage hiring outweigh its det-
rimental effects. 27 He noted, for example, that a legislature could
conclude that patronage hiring strengthens party discipline, enhances
party effectiveness, promotes a two-party system, and provides minor-
22. See infra notes 399-402 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., LEN O'CONNOR, CLOUT: MAYOR DALEY AND His CITY (1975) (describing how
the "machine" evolved in Chicago in the first three-quarters of the Twentieth Century); M.
RAKOVE, WE DON'T WANT NoBoDY NOBODY SENT: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE DALEY YEARS
(1979) (describing, in the often colorful words of important and not-so-important party workers,
how the "machine" worked); MIKE RoYKo, Boss: RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO (1971)
(describing Mayor Daley's rise to power and his creation of a political organization). See also
Bowman, supra note 3, at 62-65. Of course, political patronage in Chicago did not begin with
Richard J. Daley. Mayor Carter Harrison operated a successful patronage machine in the late
Nineteenth Century. DONALD L. MILLER, CITY OF THE CENTURY: THE EPic OF CHICAGO AND
THE MAKING OF AMERICA 434 (1996). Once again, Finley Peter Dunne's Mr. Dooley put it
more colorfully. "Charter Haitch? What wud a man that's been mayor iv Chicago do with an
infeeryor job like th' prisdincy?" FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 96 (1906).
24. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990) (extending the hold-
ing of Elrod to include promotions, transfers and hiring decisions based on political patronage);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976) (holding patronage dismissals severly restrict political
belief and association); Vickery v. Jones, 100 F.3d 1334 (7th Cir. 1996); Tarpley v. Jeffers, 96 F.3d
921 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that state officials had qualified immunity in hiring temporary em-
ployees on political patronage grounds); Shakman v. Democratic Party of Cook County, 569 F.
Supp. 177 (N.D. I11. 1983) (holding eliminated political considerations in hiring of governmental
employees). Of course, Illinois lacks a monopoly on political patronage. New York and Louisi-
ana are two other jurisdictions in which patronage is common. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 140-44 (1983) (cause of action originated in New Orleans); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507. 508 (1980) (cause of action originated in New York).
25. 497 U.S. 62, 92 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 97. (stating that long tradition and no basis for holding patronage-based dismissals,
violates the First Amendment).
27. Id. at 104.
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ity groups with political access. 28 Other commentators have disputed
the validity of the political patronage benefits recited by Justice Scalia
and have in fact argued the opposite.29 Whatever the merits of pa-
tronage hiring, the practice is largely disfavored in law, even though it
continues to flourish in Illinois and elsewhere. 30
An examination of modern political patronage cases begins with
Elrod v. Burns.31 In Elrod, the petitioners were non-civil service em-
ployees of the Illinois Cook County Sheriff's Office, and members of
the Republican Party.32 The petitioners alleged that they were dis-
missed, or threatened with dismissal, solely because they belonged to
the Republican Party.33 In December 1970, Sheriff Elrod, a Demo-
crat, assumed office from his Republican predecessor and fired, or
threatened to fire, non-civil service Republican employees who re-
fused to change parties. 34 It had become a long-standing practice of
the Cook County Sheriff to replace non-civil service employees with
members of his own political party.35
The petitioners argued that their discharge violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and ac-
cordingly sought relief under sections 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 of
Title 42 of the United States Code.36 Writing for a plurality of the
Court, Justice Brennan found that patronage hiring imposed restraints
on the freedoms of belief and association, as well as the "free-func-
tioning of the electoral process." 37 Justice Brennan acknowledged
that preservation of the democratic process could justify limits on First
Amendment rights. 38 However, he concluded that patronage dismis-
sals as a means of preserving the democratic process, were not the
28. Id. at 104-10. Justice Scalia relied on Justice Powell's dissenting opinions in Branti and
Elrod. See id. at 105.
29. See Bowman supra note 3, at 111-15.
30. See Bowman supra note 5, at 358-61. Patronage hiring need not be based on political
party affiliation. The Chicago Tribune recently reported that John Stroger, President of the
Cook County Board, had appointed or "recommended" the hiring of many members of his ex-
tended family for Cook County jobs. Robert Becker, Stroger the One to See About a Job, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 3, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2918346.
31. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
32. Id. at 350.
33. Id. at 351.
34. Id. at 350-51.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 350. Section 1983 only offers a cause of action for a deprivation of a petitioner's civil
rights in violation of the Constitution or other applicable federal law. See Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 615-19 (1979). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 is also known as
the "Ku Klux Klan Act." Id. at 611 n.25.
37. 427 U.S. at 356.
38. Id. at 368.
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least restrictive means available to promote that goal.39 Justice Bren-
nan noted, for example, that patronage dismissals could impair the
democratic process by entrenching a single party.40 Accordingly, the
Court held patronage dismissals were unconstitutional, except when
they involved the dismissals of persons in "policy making" positions.41
Four years later the Court dealt with the policy-making exception in
a case from New York, Branti v. Finkel.4 2 The respondents in Branti
were two assistant public defenders employed by Rockland County,
New York. 43 The respondents learned that they were going to be dis-
charged by the Public Defender solely because they were members of
the Republican Party.44 The respondents obtained a temporary re-
straining order from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York enjoining the Public Defender from terminating
their employment on the basis of their party affiliation. 45 The district
court held that the respondents could not be discharged solely on the
basis of their political party affiliation unless they occupied policy-
making positions. 46 In particular, the district court found the petition-
ers did not occupy a confidential position in relation to the policy-
making process. 47 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed. 48
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's decision and ac-
cepted the reasoning of the district court that confidentiality and pol-
icy-making must involve partisan political objectives. 49 In the case of
an assistant public defender, the Court found that the policy-making
and confidentiality alleged to justify the dismissals related only to the
needs of individual clients, not to the larger issues of partisan polit-
ics. 50 The upshot of the decision in Elrod and Branti was the prohibi-
tion of political patronage based discharges, unless the employee
occupied a position requiring confidentiality and policy-making re-
39. Id. at 369.
40. Id. Patronage can result in the entrenchment of one or a few parties to the exclusion of
others.
41. Id. at 372. Policies which the electorate has sanctioned are effectively implemented with
this decision. ld.
42. 445 U.S. at 508 (1980).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 509-11.
47. Id. at 511. Thus, the court found the only confidential aspect of their work was that re-
lated to the work product of their attorney-client relationships. Id.
48. 445 U.S. at 509.
49. Id. at 518-20.
50. Id. at 519.
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lated to partisan political objectives.51 The two decisions served to
restrict the ability of government employers to discharge rank and file
employees on the basis of an employee's political affiliation.
In Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook County,52 the
Northern District of Illinois held that hiring on the basis of political
party affiliation was illegal.53 In 1969, the plaintiffs, individually and
on behalf of independent candidates, voters, and taxpayers in Cook
County, sued in district court alleging that various defendants, includ-
ing the City of Chicago, violated their constitutional rights by condi-
tioning employment upon political party affiliation.54 The district
court dismissed the complaint, but the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded. 55 The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari and settlement negoti-
ations began. 56 On May 5, 1972, the district court approved the settle-
ment and entered a consent decree applying to those employees
already hired. 57 As part of that decree, the court retained jurisdiction
for the parties to continue litigating the issue of whether political affil-
iation may be considered in hiring employees. 58
In 1979, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment finding that the defendants had illegally hired employees for
government positions on the basis of political party affiliations. 59 In
1983, the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and pro-
vided relief as determined by the 1979 order. The judgment generally
followed the policy-making exception of Branti,60 and provided for
certain categories of exempt employees, such as department heads.61
51. See supra note 5, at 344, 344 n.21.
52. 569 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. I11. 1983).
53. Id. at 178. Governmental employees were to be free of all coercion and discrimination
based on political considerations.
54. Id. at 204-05 (discussing Shakman, 310 F. Supp. 1398 (N.D. I1. 1969)).
55. Id. at 178 (discussing Shakman, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 569 F. Supp. at 205.
59. Id. at 178 (discussing Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook County, 481 F. Supp. 1315
(N.D. Ill. 1979)). The Shakman decision took fourteen years to be resolved because the pro-
ceedings were split into what amounted to three phases. First, the negotiations that led to the
consent decree in 1972 involved employees already hired. Id. Between 1972 and 1979, the issue
of whether the plaintiffs were impermissibly denied employment on the basis of political affilia-
tion continued to be litigated. id. After partial summary judgment was entered for the plaintiffs
in 1979, the court held multiple hearings and reviewed briefs to determine the plaintiffs' remedy.
Id. The remedy was entered with the 1983 judgment. Id. at 205-06.
60. 445 U.S. at 508.
61. Id. at 206.
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In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,62 the United States Su-
preme Court upheld the general principle expressed in the Shakman
decisions; political patronage is an impermissible basis for hiring gov-
ernment employees, although certain policy-making positions may be
exempt. 63 The issue in Rutan was an executive order promulgated by
Governor James Thompson of Illinois on November 12, 1980, in which
he imposed a hiring freeze for every agency under his authority.64 The
order affected sixty thousand state positions, of which approximately
five thousand became vacant each year through resignation, retire-
ment, or death.65 The order further stated, "no exceptions" would be
allowed without the governor's express permission. 66 However, the
plaintiffs in Rutan alleged Governor Thompson's express permission
was granted routinely through the Governor's Office of Personnel. 67
The various agencies would screen applicants under the Illinois civil
service system, make their choices, and then submit them to the Office
of Personnel to be approved or denied. 68
Rutan and the other petitioners alleged that the practice of routing
hiring decisions through the Office of Personnel camouflaged a politi-
cal patronage system that restricted state employment to those affili-
ated with the Republican Party.69 The petitioners alleged that the
Office of Personnel specifically considered whether the applicant had
voted in past Republican primaries, whether the applicant had pro-
vided financial support to Republican Party candidates or promised to
work for the party, and whether the applicant had the support of Re-
publican Party officials at state or local levels. 70
The United States Supreme Court held that Elrod and Branti ap-
plied to the facts of Rutan regarding those petitioners who were de-
nied promotion or rehiring following layoffs.71 Rutan alleged that she
62. 497 U.S. at 62.
63. Id. at 72. The 1979 Shakman decision held that the defendants had wrongly based hiring
decisions on impermissible political considerations. See United States v. Holley, 481 F. Supp. 61
(S.D. Fla. 1979). The 1983 Shakman decision enjoined the defendants from conditioning the
hiring of all but some exempt categories of prospective employees on political grounds. See
Shakman, 569 F. Supp. at 179, 191.
64. 497 U.S. at 64.
65. Id. at 60. Every agency, bureau board, or commission subject to the governor's control fell
under the scope of the executive order. Id. at 65.
66. Id. at 65.
67. Id. at 66. The agency was expressly created for this purpose. Id.
68. Id. Some employment decisions have required approval for new hires, promotions, trans-
fers, and recalls after layoffs.
69. Id.
70. 497 U.S. at 66.
71. Id. at 74-79. The same First Amendment concerns in those decisions were implicated
[Vol. 50:265
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had been denied promotions to supervisory positions for which she
was qualified because of her support of the Democratic Party.72
Other plaintiffs, who either were, or had been, State of Illinois em-
ployees, alleged that they had not been recalled after layoffs because
they voted in Democratic primaries, or lacked the support of Republi-
can party workers.73 The Court noted that the government's interest
in maintaining effective employees could be met by dismissal or de-
motion for deficient work, while the government's interest in hiring
employees who would loyally implement its policies could be secured
by selecting certain high-level employees on the basis of their political
affiliation. 74 Thus, the Court held that promotions, transfers, and re-
calls after layoffs, based on political affiliation, impermissibly violated
the First Amendment rights of government employees. 75 "The First
Amendment prevents the government, except in the most compelling
circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its employees'
freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not associ-
ate."' 76 The Court also extended the principles of Elrod and Branti to
hiring decisions, holding that the government's rejection of an appli-
cant on the basis of his political party affiliation restricted the appli-
cant's exercise of his First Amendment rights.77
Rutan did not mark the end of political patronage litigation in Illi-
nois. In 1996, plaintiff Gary Vickery alleged that state officials in Illi-
nois, and certain members of the Illinois Republican Party, continued
to operate a political patronage system in violation of the Constitu-
tion.78 Specifically, Vickery alleged that certain Illinois state officials,
as well as members of the Illinois Republican Party, supported finan-
cial and political backers of the Illinois Republican Party for employ-
ment as highway maintainers.79 After Rutan was handed down by the
Supreme Court, Governor James Thompson and his successor Gover-
nor Jim Edgar ordered that hiring, or other personnel decisions
should not be made on the basis of an applicant's political party affili-
72. Id. at 67.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 69-70.
75. Id. at 75-76.
76. 497 U.S. at 76.
77. Id. at 74-75.
78. Vickery v. Jones, 100 F.3d 1334, 1334-36 (7th Cir. 1996). According to the opinion, Vick-
ery alleged a violation of sections 1983 and 1988 under Title 42. Id. Section 1983 provides a
cause of action for a deprivation of a petitioner's civil rights in violation of other federal laws.
See Chapman 441 U.S. at 616.
79. Id. at 1335.
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ation.8 0 However, Governor Edgar determined that temporary em-
ployees would be treated as exempt from Rutan, thus allowing
political affiliation to be considered in their hiring.81 In fact, political
party affiliation and support were among the criteria used in filling
temporary positions. 82 The Illinois Department of Transportation
hired the plaintiff, Gary Vickery, as a temporary highway maintainer
on the basis of his brother's recommendation. 83 His brother, Randy
Vickery, was the chairman of the Gallatin County Republican Central
Committee at the time.8 4 Gary Vickery performed his duties satisfac-
torily, but when his six-month contract expired, the position went to
another applicant.85 Meanwhile, the plaintiff's brother, Randy, had
been replaced as the chairman of the Gallatin County Republican
Central Committee.8 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
damages suit on the ground that the unconstitutionality of political
patronage based personnel decisions regarding temporary employees
had not been established at the time the incidents at issue occurred. 87
Therefore, official immunity barred a damages claim against govern-
ment officials for the violation of the law. 88 Furthermore, the court
held that qualified immunity protected the state officials from an
award of damages, and the plaintiff had failed to show state action
regarding the party defendants. 89
Prior to the decision in Vickery, but after the incidents precipitating
that case, the United States Supreme Court decided O'Hare Truck
Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake.9°1 The respondent, the City of Nor-
thlake, coordinated a towing service through its police department,
80. Id. at 1336-37. However, Governor Edgar determined that temporary employees would
be treated as exempt from the holding in Rutan.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1337. The defendants admitted that this was true in awarding temporary highway
maintenance positions in Illinois Department of Transportation. Id.
83. Id.
84. 100 F.3d at 1337.
85. Id. The position was not advertised or posted in any way. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1346-47. No evidence of deliberate deception by the plaintiffs was offered. Id. at
1340.
88. Id. at 1343. Regardless of subjective motivation, this immunity still applies. Id.
89. Id. at 1340. See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 656 (1980) (holding
that the liability for Constitutional violations is quite properly the concern of its elected or ap-
pointed officals). Municipalities and states have no immunity from damages for violations of the
United States Constitution caused by their employees' actions. 445 U.S. at 655-60. Section 1983
creates a cause of action that local governments may not avoid. In contrast, municipal and state
employees, who act in good faith, are protected from personal liability by qualified immunity.
Id. at 657.
90. 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
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which maintained a rotating list of available towing services. 91 When-
ever a request for a tow was made to the police department, the dis-
patcher would call the towing service next on the list.92 O'Hare Truck
Service had been on the rotating list for almost thirty years. 93 Prior to
the events at issue, the City of Northlake had only removed towing
services from the list for cause. 94
In 1989, the new mayor of Northlake, Reid Paxson, affirmed that
O'Hare would only be removed from the list for deficient service. 95
Four years later, during Paxson's reelection campaign, John Gratzi-
anna, the owner of O'Hare, refused to make a campaign contribution
to Paxson while openly supporting Paxson's opponent.96 After Pax-
son was reelected, O'Hare was removed from the rotating list.9
7
O'Hare sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging an infringement of its
First Amendment rights.98
The United States Supreme Court extended the principles of Elrod
and Branti to decisions regarding independent contractors, holding
that the government "may not coerce support ... unless it has some
motive beyond dislike of the individual's political association." 99 The
Court found unpersuasive the respondents' argument that since
O'Hare could have been terminated at any time for any reason, in-
cluding punishment for political opposition, no justification was re-
quired for the dismissal.100 Although government officials can
terminate at-will relationships without cause, "it does not follow that
this discretion can be exercised to impose conditions on expressing, or
not expressing, specific political views . .. ."10l
The line of decisions from Elrod through O'Hare Trucking estab-
lished that the government may not base employment decisions on
political party affiliations, with the limited exception for those em-
ployees in policy-making positions. This restriction applied to both
government and private actors, whenever the state action requirement
could be met. Left unresolved, however, was the problem of how to
91. Id. at 715. This has been the practice for at least 30 years. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 712.
95. Id. at 715.
96. 518 U.S. at 715. Gratzianna displayed the opponent's campaign posters at O'Hare's place
of business. Id.
97. Id. at 715-16.
98. Id. An action was also brought under Revised Statute Section 1979. Id.
99. Id. at 720-26. Coercion was present just as it was in Elrod and Branti. Id.
100. Id. at 725-26. Governmental entities can terminate at-will relationships, but cannot im-
pose conditions that impute political patronage. Id.
101. Id. at 725-26.
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reconcile the associational rights of private individuals, when the as-
sertion of those rights was adverse to one of the enumerated First
Amendment rights of other private individuals, and evidence of state
action was inconclusive. This is the problem adddressed in Tarpley v.
Keistler.
B. The Right of Petition
The particular enumerated right at issue in Tarpley v. Keistler is the
right of petition. Therefore, an examination of that right and its inter-
pretation in case law prior to the development of the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine is necessary to understand what distinguishes the
right of petition from the other enumerated rights of speech, press,
and assembly.
1. Origins of the Right of Petition
An analysis of the right of petition must begin with an examination
of the petition clause itself. The First Amendment provides, "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances."t 2 In the Congressional
debate on what would become the First Amendment, James Madison
clearly stated that the purpose of the right of petition was to enable
citizens to "communicate their will" through direct petitions to the
102. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The historical evolution of the right of petition in Anglo-Ameri-
can jurisprudence from its origins in medieval England to its incorporation in the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States is beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, a
brief overview of the evolution of the right of petition may be useful.
Although the earliest of example of a petition in Anglo-American legal history is the English
leaders' petition to Aethelred the Unready in 1013, the Magna Carta of 1215 is generally be-
lieved to have secured the right of petition in English law. See Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make
No Law Abridging... ": An Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54
U. CIN. L. REv. 1153, 1154-55 (1986). The Magna Carta was King John's response to his barons'
petition for redress of various grievances. Id. at 1155. A century later, the right had been ex-
panded so that noblemen, sometimes individually and sometimes collectively, commonly peti-
tioned the King for favors as well as redress of grievances. Id. at 1156. In that period petitions
provided the mechanism by which new laws were initiated. Id. at 1155-56. The Seventeenth
Century, a period of constitutional crisis, internal unrest, and finally civil war, and petitioning
grew in popularity among commoners as a means of protesting, among other things, taxes, dis-
persal of the army, and state religious institutions. Id. at 1156-62. However, the right was not
protected. One could be imprisoned for petitioning if the petition was presented in a disorderly
manner or if the petition was intended to be "seditious." Id. at 1158-59. Not until the Eight-
eenth Century did the right of petition come to enjoy a protected status in England. Id. at 1166-
67. Protection of the right of petition was not the case in the American colonies until the time of
the American Revolution. Id. at 1173. Pre-union colonial constitutions affirmed the right and
eventually it became part of the First Amendment. Id.
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legislature or officials of the government. 10 3 An examination of the
debate on the language of the amendment indicates that Madison and
others intended the right of petition, as well as each of the other enu-
merated rights, to be separate and distinct rights. 1 4
The original text of the proposed amendment stated that "[tlhe
freedom of speech and of the press, and the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to
the Government for redress of grievances, shall not be infringed."' 0 5
The word "petition" was not used in the proposed amendment, but
rather the word "apply." Congressman Thomas Tucker of South Car-
olina moved to add "instruct their representatives" to the phrase "ap-
ply to the Government for a redress of grievances.' 10 6 The Federalists
argued that such an instruction' °7 would bind the legislature to the
"popular opinions of the moment."'1 8 Representative Roger Sher-
man, a Federalist, replied that the wiser practice was to receive the
counsel of the people indirectly through their speech and press, or
when they assembled and directly presented grievances through peti-
tions. 109 The right of petition became one of several mechanisms by
which citizens could inform the government of their concerns, thereby
securing the greatest degree of direct access a citizen had to his
government.
Representative Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts moved to de-
lete the words "assemble and," and argued that the freedom of speech
embraced the freedom of assembly. 10 "If people freely converse to-
gether, they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-evident
103. 1 ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS FROM 1789 TO 1856, at 141 (New York,
D. Appleton & Co., 1857) (hereinafter "ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DFBATES"). "[T]he people may
therefore publicly address their representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their sen-
timents by petition to the whole body; in all these ways they may communicate their will." Id. at
141-42 (emphasis added).
104. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1051-52
(1971); Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to
Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2207-12 (1998).
105. See Smith, supra note 102, at 1175 (emphasis added).
106. See ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES, supra note 103, at 188; Mark, supra note 104, at
2209.
107. Instruction referred to the process by which constituents would compose a list of direc-
tions to send to their representatives directing or "instructing" them how to vote on particular
issues. It is a form of referendum. The practice was particularly common in colonial New En-
gland. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 189-90
(1969).
108. See ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES, supra note 103, at 189.
109. Id. at 189-90.
110. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 630 (1999).
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unalienable right which the people possess .... ""' Neither Congress-
man Sedgwick, nor any other participant in the debate, argued that
assembly included or restricted the right of petition.'t 2 Although that
portion of the debate centered around an explicit right of assembly, in
defeating Congressman Sedgwick's motion, opponents countered that
each of the enumerated rights was a separate right inherent in the
people and therefore should be accorded specific protection against
government infringement. 13
As those early congressional debates indicated, the rights of speech,
press, assembly, and petition were enumerated because they were in-
tended to be separate rights.' " In particular, the debates suggested
that the right of petition was intended, from the beginning of the Re-
public, to be a separate right providing the means by which a citizen
could directly inform the government, or some official within the gov-
ernment, of a matter of concern to the citizen.1 '5 Congressional de-
bates on the First Amendment never explicitly stated what was unique
or special about the right of petition that justified its enumeration.
Logically, the Framers must have believed that the right of petition
was distinct to some degree from the rights of speech, press, and as-
sembly. If the right of petition was not distinct, the Framers would not
have bothered to enumerate it separately and defend that position in
debate.
The right of petition is not surplusage. As Madison stated, the right
of petition allows the people to "communicate their will" to the gov-
ernment. 16 The key to understanding the right of petition lies in ap-
preciating how the right of petition strengthens the freedoms of
speech, press, and assembly in enabling citizens to communicate their
will to the government.
2. Early Cases
Perhaps the earliest case construing the First Amendment right of
petition is Harris v. Huntington."7 In Harris, the defendant sent a
letter to the Vermont Legislature impugning the qualifications and
111. 1d.
112. Id. at 631. Opponents of Representative Sedgwick's motion realized that assembly was
often essential to collective petitioning. See, e.g., Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment
Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different Cloth, 21 HAS-
iNGS CONST. L. Q. 13, 41 (1993) (discussing the evolution of the right of petition).
113. Andrews, supra note 110 at 631.
114. Id. at 631-2.
115. Id. at 630.
116. See supra note 103, at 141.
117. 2 Tyl. 129 (Vt. 1802).
[Vol. 50:265
TARPLEY v. KEISTLER
character of the plaintiff to hold the office of Justice of the Peace." 8
The plaintiff sued alleging libel, but the court held that the issue of
libel was irrelevant because the letter was protected as a petition di-
rected to the branch of the Vermont Legislature charged with electing
Justices of the Peace.' 19 "The first exception [to the lower court's de-
cision] involves a question of greater magnitude, and more interesting
to the people of Vermont [sic] than any which has been hitherto agi-
tated in this Court, to wit, whether it is actionable in the citizens to
represent their grievances by petition to the General Assembly.' ' 20
The court held the letter was not actionable because "[a]n absolute
and unqualified indemnity from all responsibility in the petitioner is
indispensable ... for it would be an absurd mockery in a government
to hold out this privilege to its subjects, and then punish them for the
use of it."
'121
Massachusetts departed from Harris in Bodwell v. Osgood,2 2 on
the issue of whether libel in a petition to the government was abso-
lutely protected. "[A] false complaint, made with express malice, or
without probable cause, to a body having competent authority to re-
dress the grievance complained of, may be the subject of an action for
libel.' 23 The United States Supreme Court relied on Bodwell in
White v. Nicholls.1 24 In White, the Court held that libel in a petition
was not protected if there was "express malice," but conceded that if
the petitioner had proceeded with "honest intentions," his actions
would be entitled to protection.125 The decisions in Harris, Bodwell,
and White focused primarily on the contents of the respective peti-
tions and whether they could be protected if libelous. In addition,
each decision acknowledged that the right of petition exists to permit
petitioners' direct access to "a body having [the] competent authority
to redress the grievance."'126
The United States Supreme Court gave further expression to the
right of petition a generation later in United States v. Cruikshank.127
In Cruikshank, a group of former slaves charged the defendants with
conspiring to prevent them from exercising their right to assemble
118. Id.
119. Id. at 146.
120. Id. at 135.
121. Id. at 139-40.
122. 3 Pick. 379 (Mass. 1824).
123. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
124. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
125. Id. at 290 (citing Bodwell, 3 Pick. at 384-85).
126. 3 Pick. at 379.
127. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
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peaceably. 128 The Court held that "[t]he right of the people peaceably
to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of
grievances, or for any thing else connected with the powers or the duties
of the national government, is an attribute of national citizenship
.... ,"129 The United States Government could protect such an assem-
bly, the Court continued, because an assembly for the purpose of peti-
tioning the government for redress of grievances invoked a
constitutionally protected right. 30 An assembly for any other gener-
ally lawful purpose was not so protected because a specific constitu-
tional right was not implicated. 131 The right of petitioning, the Court
held, merited special protection because it was the means by which
the petitioner had access to his government. 132
During the latter part of the Nineteenth Century, the right of peti-
tion began to evolve beyond the form in which it had existed in the
early years of the Republic. Along with the evolution of the right of
petition, its distinctive value from the other enumerated First Amend-
ment rights began to emerge more clearly. Not only did the right of
petition secure a citizen's right of access to his government, it also
allowed him to choose freely the subject matter of his petition, 133 and
the agency or individual to whom he would direct that petition. 134 Of
course, in one sense the right of petition remained a component of a
broader right to freedom of expression, which included speech, press,
and assembly. Therefore, choosing the subject matter of a petition or
128. Id. at 551. The complaint did not specifically mention the right of petition the govern-
ment for redress of grievances. In failing to so specify, the court held the complaint defective in
presenting a cause of action, the remedy to which could not be supplied by the federal govern-
ment. Id. at 553.
129. Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 552-53.
131. Id. at 553. The incident at issue in Cruikshank occurred in 1872 in Colfax, Louisiana.
Contending political factions engaged in a battle, which has been described as "the bloodiest
single act of carnage in all of Reconstruction." RANDALL KENNE)Y, RACE, CRIME, AND THE
LAW 50 (1997) (citing ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCI'ION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
530 (1988)).
The faction opposing Reconstruction killed about 280 African-Americans, many of
whom were unarmed. Id. The federal government indicted 97 individuals under the
Enforcement Act of 1870, but only managed to bring nine to trial and to convict three.
Id. The United States Supreme Court overturned the three convictions on the grounds
that the prosecutors failed to charge the defendants with crimes punishable by the fed-
eral government. Id. The Court held that the prosecution failed to make explicit
charges that the defendants attacked the victims because of their race. Id. Absent an
explicit charge of racial motive, the actions of the defendants were not crimes under
federal law. Id.
132. 92 U.S. at 552.
133. See Cruikshank, supra note 127 at 542.
134. See Bodwell, supra note 122.
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the government agency to receive it could be interpreted simply as an
exercise of the freedom of expression. However, the right of petition
was also slowly beginning to immunize certain forms of expression,
which might otherwise be actionable, as long as those expressions
were presented as requests for governmental action. In contrast to
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 35 the Nineteenth Century
expanded the definition of what constituted a petition as well as the
classes of expression meriting immunity.1 36
3. Twentieth Century Cases
Twentieth Century petition cases are few, but nevertheless instruc-
tive because the cases continued the expansion of both the definition
of petition and the forms of expression meriting immunity as petitions.
For example, in DeJonge v. Oregon 137 the United States Supreme
Court first applied the term "cognate rights" to describe the enumer-
ated First Amendment rights of speech, press, assembly, and peti-
tion. 38 Citing Cruikshank, the Court held that peaceful assembly for
lawful public discussion could not be made a crime.' 39 The petitioner
DeJonge was free to participate in a public meeting held under the
auspices of the Communist Party, so long as the purpose of the meet-
ing itself was lawful.' 40 Similarly, in Thomas v. Collins,'4' the Court
specifically identified the rights of petition and assembly as "cognate
rights" in striking down a Texas statute that prohibited individuals
from soliciting union membership without first obtaining a union or-
ganizer's card. 142 "Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded.
The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was insured,
135. Mark, supra note 104, at 2170-74. "A [petition] was a communication which, to be pro-
tected, had to take a certain form and embody certain components." Id. at 2171. "By the seven-
teenth century... [a] petition was a communication that, 1) had to be addressed to an authority
such as the King, 2) had to state a grievance, and, 3) had to pray for relief." Id. at 2173. In the
early years of the Republic, petitions composed in a "certain form" were frequently directed to
Congress and Congress attempted to pass on them. Id. at 2212. As the debate over slavery
intensified, the volume of petitions grew until Congress imposed a "gag rule" on petitions con-
cerning slavery or its abolition. Id. at 2216-17. Although Congress eventually repealed the "gag
rule," the period when the rule was in effect is thought by some to mark the decline of formal
petitions and consequently the right of petition itself. Id. at 2215-28.
136. See supra notes 117-35 and accompanying text. As Professor Mark noted, with a change
in political culture in the Nineteenth Century, distinguishing petitions from political speech be-
came more difficult to do. Mark, supra note 104, at 2228. In part, this process was a concomi-
tant to "the independent expansion of the protection of speech and press." Id. at n.358.
137. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
138. Id. at 364.
139. Id. at 364-65.
140. Id. at 365-66.
141. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
142. Id. at 518, 530.
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and with it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political
ones .... [F]ree speech and a free press are not confined to any field
of human interest. '143
In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 144 a com-
mittee of the Florida Legislature investigated the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) because of
suspected Communist affiliations. 45 The committee ordered the peti-
tioner, Gibson, to produce the membership list of the Florida
NAACP. 146 Gibson refused to produce the list arguing that to do so
would compromise the associational rights of NAACP members, and
potential NAACP members under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. 147 A Florida state court adjudged Gibson in contempt, and
sentenced him to six months in prison and a $1,200 fine. 148 The
United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment holding that
compulsory process must be carefully restricted when, absent any evi-
dence of illegal or subversive activity, it threatens to impinge upon
First Amendment freedoms. 149
Of relevance to this Note is Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in
Gibson, which examined associational rights and the right of assem-
bly. 150 Justice Douglas noted that "[j]oining a group is often as vital to
freedom of expression as utterance itself. Joining a political party may
be as critical to expression of one's views as hiring reporters is to the
establishment of a free press."' 15 Justice Douglas recognized that
neither political party affiliations, nor other kinds of affiliations occur
in a vacuum. Membership in a political party, or in any of free soci-
ety's "innumerable institutions," is where "views and opinions are ex-
pressed, opinions mobilized, and social, economic, religious,
educational, and political programs are formulated. ' 152 "A coming
together is often necessary for communication-for those who listen as
well as for those who speak." 53 During the second half of the Twenti-
eth Century, the United States Supreme Court had expanded the defi-
nition of petition beyond the classical forms of the Seventeenth,
Eighteenth, and early Nineteenth Centuries, to include a wide range
143. Id. at 531.
144. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
145. Id. at 540-41.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 542-43.
148. Id. at 543.
149. Id. at 558.
150. Id. at 562-65 (Douglas, J., concurring).
151. 372 U.S. at 565 (Douglas, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 563.
153. Id. at 564.
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of concerns, which did not have to be especially momentous to merit
protection. 154 The Court also began to accept that the right of petition
did not have to be restricted to traditional oral or written expressions,
but could be implicated, for example, by membership in a group.1 55
Although the Supreme Court expanded the scope and definition of
the right of petition during the Twentieth Century, it stopped short of
granting blanket immunity to any act that could be characterized as a
petition in McDonald v. Smith. 156 The Court declined to elevate the
petition clause to "special First Amendment status."'1 57 In McDonald,
the petitioner wrote two allegedly defamatory letters to President
Ronald Reagan and other members of the government claiming that
the respondent, under consideration at that time for the position of
United States Attorney, engaged in fraud, extortion, and civil rights
violations. 5 8 The United States District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina denied the petitioner's motion for a judgment on
the pleadings holding that the petition clause did not confer absolute
immunity from liability for libel. 159 Both the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court,
following White160and Bodwell,' 61 affirmed the decision. 162
C. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine evolved from two cases decided by
the United States Supreme Court in the early 1960s, Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 163 and United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington.164 In Noerr Motor Freight, a group
of forty-one Pennsylvania truck operators and their trade association,
the Pennsylvania Motor Truck Association, alleged that the defend-
ants, twenty-four eastern railroads, conspired to restrain trade and
154. See supra notes 142-44.
155. See supra notes 150-53. Justice Douglas would make this point more forcefully in his
dissenting opinion in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 49-50 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
156. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
157. Id. at 485.
158. Id. at 480-81.
159. Id. at 482.
160. See generally Bodwell, 3 Pick. 379 (Mass. 1824) and White, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1845).
161. 472 U.S. at 482.
162. 472 U.S. at 484. Professor Mark concluded that the letters really were not petitions be-
cause they lacked "'petitionary parts.'" See Mark, supra note 103, at 2228 n.358. Of course the
letters would not fit the definition of a "classic" petition. See supra note 136 and accompanying
text (providing a definition of the "classic" petition). One point of Tarpley, as well as that of
Justice Douglas' dissent in Adderly, was that what constitutes a valid petition has changed over
300 years and continues to change. See infra notes 390-98 and accompanying text.
163. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
164. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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monopolize long-distance freight hauling in violation of the Sherman
Act. 165 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy involving the
retention of co-defendants Carl Byoir & Associates, a public relations
firm, to develop a publicity campaign to encourage the adoption of
laws detrimental to the trucking industry. 66 The plaintiffs alleged
that as a result of the campaign, the defendants had persuaded the
Governor of Pennsylvania to veto the "Fair Truck Bill, which would
have permitted truckers to carry heavier loads over the Pennsylvania
roads." 167
The defendants countered that their publicity campaign was under-
taken to inform the public and the state legislature about the exten-
sive damage done to state roads by overloaded trucks, the driving
hazards posed by such trucks, the deliberate violations of the laws re-
garding weight limitations by trucks, and the failure of the trucking
firms to pay their fair share in taxes for road maintenance. 168 Subse-
quently, the defendants filed a counter-claim alleging that the plain-
tiffs had violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to monopolize the
long-distance freight hauling business in much the same way as the
railroads allegedly had done. 169
The district court found that the railroads' publicity campaign, to
the extent that it was directed at the legislature and law-enforcement
authorities, was malicious, fraudulent, and intended to injure the
truckers' business interests by destroying the goodwill they enjoyed
among the public and their customers. 70 In holding for the truckers,
the district court found that the railroad industry employed a third
party, Carl Byoir & Associates, to conduct a malicious publicity cam-
paign intended to eliminate the trucking industry as a competitor to
the railroads.'17 Moreover, the court noted that destroying the good-
will of the trucking industry would damage the truckers in a way unre-
lated to the passage of the "Fair Truck Bill. '172 The district court
165. 365 U.S. at 128-31.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 131-32.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 132-35.
171. 365 U.S. at 132-35.
172. Id. The district court applied Justice Story's definition of good will:
[G]ood will is the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment beyond
the mere value of the capital stock, funds, or property employed therein, in conse-
quence of the general public patronage and encouragement which it receives from con-
stant or habitual customers on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or
reputation for skill, or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances
or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.
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believed the railroads could have opposed the bill in a manner not
intended to discredit the truckers. 173 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit affirmed.17 4
The petitioners filed for certiorari on the limited question of
whether the lower courts erred in holding that they had violated the
Sherman Act. 175 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed on the ground that the case involved a new application
of the Sherman Act that threatened to impose severe restrictions on
the rights of an individual to advocate for, or against, the passage of
legislation. 176 The Court held that the Sherman Act did not prohibit
two or more persons from associating together to persuade the legisla-
ture or executive to support a bill that would produce a restraint of
trade or a monopoly. 177
To hold that the government retains the power to act in this repre-
sentative capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that the people
cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would impute
to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but
political activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in
the legislative history of that Act. 178
The Court also held that such an application of the Sherman Act
would affect the First Amendment, in particular, the right of peti-
tion. 179 "The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the
Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an
intent to invade these freedoms."'180 Thus, the Court concluded that
the Sherman Act did not apply to activities soliciting government ac-
tion regarding the passage and enforcement of laws. 81
The Court further concluded that the motivation of the defendants
in seeking passage and enforcement of the laws was irrelevant, even
though the railroads intended to destroy long-distance truckers as
competitors. 182
The right of the people to inform their representatives in govern-
ment of their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 768, 810 (E.D.
Pa. 1957).
173. 155 F. Supp. at 823. See also id. at 779-801 passim (discussing the railroads publicity
campaign of "vilification" in detail).
174. 365 U.S. at 135.
175. /d.
176. Id. at 135-37, 144-45.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 137.
179. Id. at 138.
180. 365 U.S. at 138.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 138-40.
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laws cannot properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing
so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on laws
in the hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves
and a disadvantage to their competitors .... A construction of the
Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taking a public po-
sition on matters in which they are financially interested would thus
deprive the government of a valuable source of information and, at
the same time, deprive the people of their right of petition in the
very instances in which that right may be of most importance to
them.' 83
Although the Court held that motive was irrelevant in assessing the
constitutionality of actions intended to influence the government to
take action favorable to one's interests, the Court conceded that situa-
tions could exist when the application of the Sherman Act was appro-
priate.1 84 The Court held that "shams," such as the attempt to
interfere with a competitor's business through spurious publicity cam-
paigns ostensibly directed at the government, would not be
protected. 85
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,18 6 the United
Mine Workers (UMW) sued Pennington and the Phillips Brothers
Coal Company to recover $55,000 in royalty payments allegedly due
under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950
(Agreement). 187 The defendants filed a cross-claim alleging that the
UMW had violated the Sherman Act. 188 The defendants' claim fo-
cused on the injury to the smaller coal companies from having been
forced out of the industry because of the Agreement and various
other understandings between the UMW and large operators.189 The
Agreement, an arrangement between the UMW and the large opera-
tors, sought to curtail overproduction of coal by eliminating the
smaller companies through a combination of rapid mechanization and
increased wages. 90
183. Id.
184. Id. at 144.
185. Id.
186. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
187. Id. at 659. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 was a wage agree-
ment executed in 1950 between the UMW and smaller coal companies, among them Phillips
Brothers Coal Company, and later amended in 1952. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 659-60.
190. Id. The smaller coal companies could not afford to mechanize as rapidly as the larger
coal companies, but because they would still have to pay the higher wages, they would be forced
out of business by the increased operating costs. United Mine Workers of America v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. at 659-60. Larger coal companies, on the other hand, could offset what they
would pay in higher wages by lay-offs as mechanization made many employees redundant. Id.
[Vol. 50:265
TARPLEY v. KEISTLER
The larger coal companies and the UMW jointly petitioned the Sec-
retary of Labor to establish a minimum wage for employees of con-
tractors who sold coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). 191
The minimum wage was intended to make it difficult for the smaller
coal companies to compete in the TVA term contract market. 192 The
Secretary agreed to the proposed minimum wage, which was much
higher than the minimum wage in other industries.' 93 Subsequently,
both union and company representatives urged the TVA to limit its
spot-market purchases from the smaller companies because the spot-
market was exempt from the minimum wage requirements of the
Walsh-Healey Act. 194 Several of the larger companies undertook "a
destructive and collusive price-cutting campaign in the TVA spot mar-
ket for coal" to further restrict the availability of coal markets to the
smaller companies. 195
The trial court found for Phillips Coal Company, one of the smaller
operators, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed.' 96 Applying the Noerr principle, the Supreme Court re-
versed and emphasized that although the motive of the UMW was
anti-competitive, its actions were protected.' 97 "Joint efforts to influ-
ence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though in-
tended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either
standing alone or as a part of a broader scheme itself violative of the
Sherman Act."198
The Pennington Court did not elaborate on the "sham" exception
mentioned in the Noerr decision. That task was left to the Court in
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited. 99 The parties
in that case were competitors in the trucking business in California. 200
Trucking Unlimited alleged that the petitioners, California Motor
Transport, conspired to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act
by engaging in a concerted action to prevent the respondents from
acquiring operating rights. 20 1 The complaint alleged that the aim of
Companies further agreed not to lease coal lands to non-union operators or to buy or sell non-
union coal. Id.
191. Id. at 660-61.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 381 U.S. at 661.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 669-72.
198. Id. at 670.
199. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
200. Id. at 509.
201. Id.
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the conspiracy was to put the respondents out of business by harass-
ment, and denying them "free and unlimited access" to various, state
agencies charged with granting operating rights from the state.202 The
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed. 203
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's rever-
sal, holding that a combination of businessmen working to deny their
competitors meaningful access to the same agencies that they were
themselves petitioning, would satisfy the "sham" exception of Noerr-
Pennington, and accordingly would not be protected.20 4 The Court re-
manded the case to the trial court to consider those allegations. 20 5
The "sham" exception, defined in California Motor Transport,
amounted to anti-competitive activity intended to deny one's competi-
tors meaningful access to the same agencies and courts upon which
the petitioner himself relied in pursuing his own anti-competitive
aims. 20 6 In other words, one may use the legislature, executive, or
judiciary to pursue anti-competitive ends, but may not at the same
time deny competitors access to those same institutions to pursue anti-
competitive aims of their own.
1. Extension of Noerr-Pennington Immunity Beyond Anti-Trust
Claims
Although the United States Supreme Court has never considered
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine outside of antitrust jurisprudence, the
doctrine has been extended into other areas of law. 20 7 For example,
Noerr-Pennington immunity has been applied to bar tort liability, 20 8
civil rights actions, 20 9 libel claims,21°t SLAPP suits,2 ' and suits for ma-
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 515-16.
205. 404 U.S. at 515.
206. Id. at 511-12.
207. See Robert A. Zauzmer, Note, The Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in
Non-Antitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1243, 1256-65 (1984). Zauzmer argued
that the doctrine should only apply to antitrust actions because further extension risks elevating
the right of petition over other constitutional freedoms to the extent that it becomes an absolute
right. Id. at 1256-65 passim.
208. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 939 (N.D. Cal. 1972)).
209. Id. (citing Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
211. Id. (citing Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 36-37 (W. Va. 1981)).
211. Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 524-27 (N.D. I1. 1990). SLAPP suits
(Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) are retaliatory lawsuits often filed by real es-
tate developers against purchasers who complain publicly about problems such as plumbing or
sewer installation. See Art Golab, Developers SLAPP Homeowners; Lawsuits Aim to be a Pain
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licious prosecution. 212 Courts have also extended Noerr-Pennington
immunity to bar section 1983 actions.213 Cases applying the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine to bar section 1983 actions have fallen into
roughly two categories: zoning actions, and employment-related
actions.214
a. The Zoning Cases
The zoning cases rest on the courts' holdings that private individuals
have the right, under the First Amendment right of petition, to com-
municate concerns to their representatives. Two of the earlier zoning
cases prefigured the extension of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to
section 1983 actions. In Aknin v. Phillips,215 the defendants com-
plained to officials of the Village of Mamaroneck, New York, that the
plaintiffs' discotheque, which operated into the early hours of the
morning, was creating a disturbance in the defendants' residential
neighborhood. 21 6 The purpose of the defendants' complaint was to
effect a re-zoning of the area, which would prohibit operation of the
discotheque.217 The plaintiffs sued alleging that the defendants con-
spired to close the discotheque, and deprive the plaintiffs of their con-
stitutional rights. 218 The court held that the First Amendment
in the Wallet, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000, at 3. The developer's purpose behind the suits is to
retaliate for perceived slander or to scotch opposition to proposals. Id. Increasingly, businesses
are filing SLAPP suits against other businesses. Aaron R. Gary, First Amendment Petition
Clause Immunity from Tort Suits: In Search of a Consistent Doctrinal Framework, 33 IDAHO L.
REV. 67, 72-73 (1996).
212. See Zauzmer, supra note 207, at 1258 (citing City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 645 P.2d 137,
139-40 (Cal. 1982)).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides that:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ...
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ....
See, e.g., Eaton v. Newport Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1992); Video Int'l. Prod., Inc. v.
Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1988); Stachura v. Truszkow-
ski, 763 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1985); Evers v. County of Custer, 745 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1984);
Gorman Towers v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980); Nickum v. Village of Saybrook,
972 F. Supp. 1160 (C.D. I1. 1997); Sawmill Products, Inc. v. Town of Cicero, 477 F. Supp. 636
(N.D. Ill. 1979); Aknin v. Phillips, 404 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to extend Noerr-Pennington immunity to section 1983
actions in Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983).
214. The zoning cases are: Aknin, Sawmill Products, Gorman Towers, Evers, and Video Inter-
national Products. The employment cases are: Stachura, Eaton, and Nickum.
215. 404 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
216. Id. at 1151-52.
217. Id. at 1152.
218. Id.
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protected the defendants' right to petition village officials to close the
discotheque. 219
They [defendants] are entitled to speak, and even to speak sharply,
to their elected representatives concerning these goals [closing the
discotheque] .... To permit maintenance of this type of civil rights
lawsuit against a private individual would under the circumstances
... have an unfortunate and unjust chilling effect upon the exercise
by members of the public of their First Amendment right to com-
plain about a public nuisance. 22°1
Similarly, in Sawmill Products v. Town of Cicero,221 a sawmill com-
pany sued the town of Cicero, Illinois, and two private individuals al-
leging a conspiracy to deprive the company and its owners of their
constitutional rights by seeking to have the sawmill's license re-
voked. 222 The Northern District of Illinois dismissed the complaint
against the private defendants holding that keeping them in the case
would "chill the exercise of their First Amendment right of peti-
tion. '223 Neither of the two preceding cases specifically cited or dis-
cussed the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
In Gorman Towers v. Bogoslavsky, 24 the court applied the same
reasoning as Aknin and Sawmill Products to the First Amendment
concerns. However, Gorman Towers became the first case where the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine was specifically cited and applied to bar
section 1983 actions. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that "private citizens and their lawyer were abso-
lutely privileged by the First Amendment to petition for the zoning
amendment that caused plaintiffs' damages. ' 225 The court relied spe-
cifically upon the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in its holding22 6 and cited
cases in which other courts had held "individual defendants constitu-
tionally immune from liability for exercising their right to petition,"
even if some of the opinions did not cite the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine.227 In addition, Gorman Towers considered the "sham" excep-
tion to Noerr-Pennington.228 "Noerr and its progeny indicate that
liability can be imposed under section 1983 for activity ostensibly de-
219. Id. at 1153.
220. Id.
221. 477 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
222. Id. at 638.
223. Id. at 642.
224. 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980).
225. Id. at 614.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 615. As noted, neither Aknin nor Sawmill Products discussed Noerr-Pennington,
but Judge Stephenson cited each in Gorman Towers. See id.
228. Id.
[Vol. 50:265
TARPLEY v. KEISTLER
signed to influence public policy only if the real purpose of the policy
is not to induce governmental action but to injure the plaintiff di-
rectly. '229 Finding that the defendants did not employ bribes or pre-
vent the plaintiffs from countering the defendants' lobbying efforts
with lobbying of their own, the court held there was no sham.230 "We
are loathe [sic] to interpret section 1983 to proscribe what we thus
understand to be traditional political activity [lobbying]. 231
In Evers v. County of Custer,232 the Ninth Circuit followed Gorman
Towers in applying the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The court used the
doctrine to bar a property owner's section 1983 action against neigh-
boring property owners who urged the county to reopen what the
plaintiff contended was a private road through her property. The de-
fendants, as neighboring property owners, argued that the road should
be public. 233 The petitioner claimed that the actions of the defendant
and the Custer County Commissioners interfered with her property
interest in the road, thereby violating her First Amendment rights.234
A more extensive analysis of Noerr-Pennington immunity and the
"sham" exception is evident in Video Products International, Inc. v.
Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc.235 Warner-Amex Cable
Communications, Inc. (WAX) petitioned the city of Dallas, Texas, for
actions on zoning ordinances that would have put Video International
Products, Inc. (VIP), a rival cable company, out of business.236 VIP
sued WAX alleging a conspiracy with the city of Dallas to drive VIP
out of business in violation both of antitrust law and the First Amend-
ment right to freedom of speech.237 The court held that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine protected WAX.238 "The point of the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine," Judge Jolly wrote, "is to protect private parties
when they petition the government for laws or interpretations of its
existing laws even though those private parties are pursuing their
goals with anticompetitive intent. ' 239 In affirming the district court's
reasoning, Judge Jolly held that WAX's First Amendment petitioning
of the city of Dallas was protected under the Noerr-Pennington doc-
229. 626 F.2d at 615.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 745 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1984).
233. Id. at 1200-01.
234. Id. at 1199.
235. 858 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1988).
236. Id. at 1077.
237. ld. at 1077, 1081.
238. Id. at 1082-84.
239. Id. at 1083.
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trine.240 The appellate court extended Noerr-Pennington immunity to
section 1983 actions, primarily on the basis of First Amendment con-
cerns rather than antitrust issues.
Judge Jolly also elaborated upon an issue that would have signifi-
cance in Tarpley, the co-conspirator exception to Noerr-Pennington.241
Under the co-conspirator exception, an illegal conspiracy between pri-
vate individuals and state actors deprives the private defendants of
Noerr-Pennington immunity, even if there is no "sham" petition. 242
There must be a "corrupt conspiracy," involving bribery or some other
selfish or corrupt motive on the part of the state actor, to trigger the
exception. 243
We think that if Noerr-Pennington is to have its intended effect at
all, an analysis of whether the petitioner is a co-conspirator under
section 1983 must parallel the co-conspirator exception with Noerr-
Pennington .... Otherwise, first amendment petitioning could be
challenged in the section 1983 context as a denial of equal protec-
tion, a taking of property without just compensation, a first amend-
ment violation, or other constitutional claim, thus vitiating Noerr-
Pennington protection. 244
According to the court, any behavior by a private individual that is
protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is also protected from
section 1983 liability.245
b. The Employment Cases
A smaller cluster of cases deal generally with employment actions.
For example, in Stachura v. Truszowski,2 46 the plaintiff sued alleging
that the defendant, a private individual, had conspired with the school
board to remove the plaintiff from his job as a schoolteacher in viola-
tion of his First Amendment right of free speech, and his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process.247 The school
board had fired the plaintiff on the basis of complaints by Ms. Trus-
zowski and others, that the plaintiff had inappropriately taught human
reproduction to his life science class.248 Mr. Stachura asserted a prop-
erty interest in his employment as a schoolteacher, the deprivation of
240. Id. at 1084. The district court decision was reversed and remanded only on the issue of
damages. 858 F.2d at 1088.
241. Id. at 1083.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1084.
245. Id.
246. 763 F.2d at 211 (6th Cir. 1985).
247. Id. at 212-13.
248. Id. at 213.
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which, without due process, amounted to violations of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 249 The court acknowledged that the defen-
dant's role in bringing about the plaintiff's dismissal was "pivotal," but
held that the defendant's actions were protected because her protests
were directed to the public body responsible for the school system.250
"While Ms. Truszowski's role in these events is not a pretty one ... it
was a petition addressed to the proper authority and as a conse-
quence, her actions were immunized from this suit by her First
Amendment rights. '251
In a similar fact pattern, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in Eaton v. Newport Board of Education,252 followed
Stachura in applying Noerr-Pennington immunity to dismiss a suit
against an individual who lobbied for the removal of a school princi-
pal.253 The court noted that a "citizen's right to petition is not limited
to goals that are deemed worthy, and the citizen's right to speak freely
is not limited to fair comments. '254
In Nickum v. Village of Saybrook,255 the district court for the Cen-
tral District of Illinois held that private defendants' actions in seeking
removal of the plaintiff, the police chief of the village, could be immu-
nized under Noerr-Pennington.256 The plaintiff alleged that a conspir-
acy between the private defendants and Village Board of Saybrook
deprived her of a property interest in her employment without due
process, and in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.25 7
The court found that the defendants were well within their rights to
seek dismissal of the police chief.258 The defendants' motives in seek-
ing the police chief's dismissal, the court continued, were irrelevant
under Noerr-Pennington, so long as their means were legitimate.259
"The Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides that the right to legitimately
petition the government through a legislature, the judiciary, or an ad-
ministrative agency is fundamental to the concept of representative
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. The court cited but did not discuss the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See 763 F.2d at
213.
252. 975 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1992).
253. Id. at 298-99.
254. Id. at 298.
255. 972 F. Supp. 1160 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
256. Id. at 1172. Provided, however, that defendants' actions did not fall within the co-con-
spirator exception. Id.
257. Id. at 1166.
258. Id.
259. 972 F. Supp. at 1171-72.
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democracy. As such it is constitutionally protected speech, no matter
what its motivation. '" 260
2. The Significance of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine for the Right
of Petition
The evolution of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine beyond antitrust
emphasizes the value of the right of petition in immunizing certain
forms of expression that might otherwise be actionable. For example,
in Adkin v. Phillips,2 6 1 the complaints of Mr. Phillips, Mrs. Sidemann,
and the other defendants were protected because they were directed
to the village officials responsible for zoning, and therefore amounted
to petitions.262 Likewise, the complaints of Truszowski and the New-
port Board of Education in Stachura and Eaton, were protected be-
cause the complaints were directed to the school boards responsible
for overseeing the administration of the schools.263 None of the com-
plaints were presented in the "classic" form of a petition. 264 However,
each complaint was classified as a petition because it sought govern-
ment action on matters that the government could properly act and
provide relief.
Additionally, the evolution of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine reaf-
firms the idea that petitions need not flow from sublime motives or
the great issues of the state. Self-interest, even to the detriment of
another's interest, is a legitimate motive so long as the means used are
themselves legitimate.265 Illegitimate means are those that deprive a
rival access to the process that the petitioner is using to advance his
own interests,266 or those means which are illegal, such as bribery.2 67
Tarpley v. Keistler is the result of this evolution.
III. THE SUBJECT OPINION
A. The Facts of the Case
In response to the Rutan decision in 1990, Governor James Thomp-
son ordered all state agencies and offices under his authority, to base
all personnel decisions on merit.26 8 Governor Thompson's successor,
260. Id. at 1171 (internal citations omitted).
261. 404 F. Supp. at 1152.
262. Id.
263. Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d at 213; Eaton v. Newport Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d at 298.
264. See supra note 135 (discussing the classic form of a petition).
265. 763 F.2d at 213.
266. 858 F.2d at 1083.
267. 404 F. Supp. at 1150-52.
268. 188 F.3d at 789-90. See also supra notes 62-77.
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Governor Jim Edgar, determined that Rutan did not apply to tempo-
rary positions.269 Consequently, Governor Edgar's administration fil-
led temporary positions with Republican Party loyalists. 27°, Edgar
Administration officials also held meetings at which they informed
Republican Party loyalists that "political affiliation could be consid-
ered in filling vacancies for temporary positions. '271 The defendant,
Frank Keistler, was the long-time chairman of the Union County Re-
publican Central Committee, and attended many of the meetings with
administration officials. 27 2 Administration officials gave Keistler and
other party workers "lists of contacts in various state agencies to
whom they could submit recommendations to fill vacant temporary
positions."273
The state operated Choate Mental Health Center in Union County
sought to fill two permanent vacancies in its power plant facility.
274
"The Department of Mental Health, which managed Choate, author-
ized Choate to fill the vacancies on a temporary basis only. '275 When
Keistler learned of the vacancies he called Natalie Bales, a personnel
officer in the Department of Mental Health, to recommend Harold
Blessing, a Republican precinct worker, for one of the positions. 27 6
Keistler also called Janice Cellini in Governor Edgar's Office of Per-
sonnel to discuss Blessing's interest in the job.27 7
"Following the normal procedures for filling vacancies, Bales called
her contact in the Governor's Personnel Office (not Cellini) ... and
was given Blessing's name. ' 278 Bales then submitted Blessing's name
to Alice Kerns, the personnel officer at Choate. 279 Four days later,
Blessing began work at Choate. 280 Blessing was never interviewed
and the vacancy was never posted.281 Later in 1992, the Department
of Mental Health made the position permanent, but once again the
position was never advertised to the public. 282 Blessing, Tarpley, and
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. 188 F.3d at 790.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. 188 F.3d at 790.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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eight others interviewed for the permanent position.2 83 The job went
to Blessing, in part because he had gained valuable experience during
his time as a temporary employee in the same job.284
B. Procedural History
Tarpley sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging infringement of his
First Amendment right of freedom of political association. 285 Tarpley
contended that Blessing was awarded the temporary, and conse-
quently the permanent position, because Blessing was a Republican
Party precinct worker. 28 6 Tarpley proposed that the Edgar adminis-
tration used temporary vacancies as a means of circumventing Rutan
to preserve a political patronage system. 287 Thus, party loyalists
would be rewarded with temporary positions, which the administra-
tion would then convert to permanent positions. 28 8 As a result, the
loyalists would have a decided advantage over other applicants for the
permanent slots because of their experience as temporary employees
in the same positions.289
The suit named both state officials and private individuals, such as
Keistler, who were Republican Party functionaries. 290 The district
court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment
in favor of all defendants with respect to the hiring decisions for per-
manent positions. 291 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed this part of the district court's decision. 292 The
Seventh Circuit also held that the state defendants were protected by
qualified immunity for the claims relating to the hiring of temporary
employees. 293 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
283. Id.
284. Id. The interviews consisted of eighteen questions to which responses were scored sepa-
rately by two interviewers on a scale of one to ten. See Tarpley v. Jeffers, 96 F.3d 921, 925 (7th
Cir. 1996) (describing the test). Blessing's advantage from previous experience in the job may
not have been the only reason he received a higher score than Tarpley. Id. at 926. On some
questions at least, the score appeared skewed in favor of Blessing. For example, to the question
"[c]an you handle having more than one boss?" Tarpley responded "yes" and received 3.5
points. Blessing responded "no problem" and received 7.5 points. Id.
285. 188 F.3d at 790.
286. Id.
287. Tarpley v. Jeffers, 96 F.3d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 1996).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. 188 F.3d at 790.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the private Republican
Party defendants regarding the temporary hiring claims. 294
On remand, Keistler moved for summary judgment, arguing that he
lacked the authority to make state hiring decisions, did not engage in a
conspiracy to gain such authority, and therefore, never acted under
the color of state law. 295 The district court granted Keistler's motion
for summary judgment, finding that Tarpley offered no admissible evi-
dence that Keistler and the other party defendants did anything more
than advocate the hiring of Blessing.296 Once again Tarpley
appealed. 297
C. Judge Cudahy's Opinion
Judge Cudahy's majority opinion first addressed the issue of
whether Keistler's conduct in recommending Blessing constituted
state action. 298 Under certain circumstances the conduct of private
individuals, such as Keistler, could constitute state action. 299 How-
ever, the answer in each case is "situation specific and fact driven. '300
Keistler argued that since he lacked the authority to hire anyone, his
recommendation of Blessing could not constitute state action.301
Keistler's argument relied heavily on the opinion in Vickery, where
the Seventh Circuit held that because the defendant lacked actual hir-
ing authority his recommendations of individuals for temporary high-
way maintainer positions could not constitute state action. 30 2 Judge
Cudahy held that Keistler's argument was incorrect to the extent that
it interpreted Vickery to hold that without actual hiring authority a
294. Id.
295. Id. at 790-91.
296. 188 F.3d at 791.
297. Id.
298. Id. Section 1983 requires that a plaintiff show a defendant acted under color of state law
when a section 1983 action is based on a violation of the First Amendment as applied to states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
299. Id. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (holding that the
actions of a restaurant worker in concert with a local police officer to deny service to a white
schoolteacher constituted state action). In Dennis v. Sparks, the Court held that bribery of a
state judge was a "corrupt conspiracy," which constituted state action on the part of the private
individual making the bribe. 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980). The Court held that a state university's
compliance with National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) regulations did not consti-
tute state action because the university retained the authority to ignore the regulations and to
withdraw from the NCAA. N.C.A.A. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193-96 (1988). One obvious
distinction between Tarkanian, and Adickes and Dennis, is that in Tarkanian the private actor's
actions were lawful. Id.
300. 188 F.3d at 793.
301. Id. at 793-94
302. Id. at 792-93
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private political party, or its functionary, could not be liable in a sec-
tion 1983 action. 30 3 Keistler's argument made hiring authority the sin-
gle determinative factor. Such a proposition, however, contradicted
the United States Supreme Court's position that state action cases
must be decided on a case by case basis. 304
Tarpley further argued that possession of ultimate hiring authority
was not dispositive of state action, particularly when the state actor
lacked the freedom to act contrary to the wishes of the private party
official. 30 5 Judge Cudahy noted that Tarpley did produce some evi-
dence suggesting a conspiracy. 30 6 For example, Keistler attended
meetings with state officials and conferred with the Governor's per-
sonnel office about Blessing's interest in the job.30 7 In turn, the Gov-
ernor's office forwarded only Blessing's name to Choate.30° A jury
could believe, Judge Cudahy conceded, that the state "simply rubber-
stamped [Keistler's] picks," thus, transforming his recommendation of
Blessing into state action for purposes of section 1983.309
However, the opinion declined to reach the issue of whether
Keistler's recommendation of Blessing constituted state action or a
conspiracy because the opinion held that Keistler's actions were pro-
tected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.3"' What Tarpley character-
izes as a conspiracy is more accurately and more commonly known as
political advocacy, another protected form of free expression. 31'
Judge Cudahy described Keistler's recommendation of Blessing as "a
paradigmatic First Amendment right," because suggesting "whom to
hire is a traditional form of political activity. '312
Keistler's motives were irrelevant, Judge Cudahy continued, be-
cause under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine a petitioner's motives may
be selfish or unworthy.3 13 In a sense, Keistler's actions were intended
to exclude Tarpley from the position at Choate, but only because
Keistler wanted to fill the position with a Republican. 31 4 Keistler did
not target Tarpley individually, and more importantly, nothing
303. Id. at 793
304. Id. "Each [state action] case is different, and each case must be considered on its own
merits." 188 F.3d at 793.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. 188 F.3d at 793.
310. Id. at 794-95.
311. Id. at 795-97.
312. Id. at 795.
313. Id.
314. 188 F.3d at 795-96.
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Keistler did prevented Democrats from recommending that their
party loyalists be hired. 315 "Advocacy is inherently partisan, and the
First Amendment guarantees freedom of such partisanship, at least in
the form of political speech."'316 As Judge Cudahy concluded:
Section 1983 claims, as much as the antitrust laws, are not appropri-
ate vehicles for proscribing political activity such as attempts to per-
suade public officials. Other contexts may dictate different results,
and First Amendment protections would not necessarily extend to
cases where the attempt itself (rather than the intended result) cre-
ated the alleged harm. In addition, where political speech is not at
stake, First Amendment protection of conspiratorial speech might
be very limited. We believe that these important distinctions "suffi-
ciently guard those constitutional rights that section 1983 serves to
protect. '317
D. Judge Ripple's Dissent
Judge Ripple's brief dissent focused upon two points. First, Judge
Ripple noted that Judge Cudahy's opinion conceded that a jury could
find that a conspiracy existed between Keistler and the state sufficient
to satisfy the state action requirement. 318 Therefore, because the issue
before the panel was a motion for summary judgment and the jury
could find a conspiracy, Judge Ripple argued that the district court's
grant of summary judgment should be overturned and the case re-
manded. 319 Secondly, Judge Ripple argued that balancing Keistler's
First Amendment rights over Tarpley's First Amendment rights was
inappropriate because of the evidence of a conspiracy, and because
favoring Keistler's rights implicitly denigrated Tarpley's freedom of
association. 320
Judge Cudahy countered that "Tarpley's evidence of conspiracy
amounts to Keistler exercising his constitutional rights at the urging of
state officials."'32' Nothing, Judge Cudahy observed, required that
Keistler's methods be old-fashioned. As a result, no significant dis-
tinction existed between the written means of communication accept-
able to Judge Ripple, and the modern telephone Keistler preferred. 322
With respect to the denigration of the freedom of association, Judge
Cudahy noted that the right of political association occurs in context
315. Id. at 795-97.
316. Id. at 795.
317. Id. at 796 (internal citations omitted).
318. Id. at 797.
319. 188 F.3d at 797.
320. Id. at 797-98.
321. Id. at 796 n.8.
322. Id.
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and "those who enter the political fray, have grander, even if selfish,
aspirations: they want to speak, assemble, petition or publish in sup-
port of something. ' 323 "[T]he right of political association comprises
(and is derivative of) the textual First Amendment rights-speech, as-
sembly, petition and press-only by protecting the scope of the compo-
nent parts (here, petition and speech) can we protect the amalgam. '324
IV. ANALYSIS
The significance of Tarpley lies beyond the decision's extension of
Noerr-Pennington immunity to section 1983 actions, particularly in the
form of political patronage. The larger significance of Tarpley lies in
its recognition of the value of the right of petition. Specifically, Tarp-
ley recognizes that the right of petition is unique and distinct in some
ways from the "cognate rights" 32 of speech, press, and assembly.
Tarpley properly recognizes that the distinctions between the rights of
petition, speech, press, and assembly, may sometimes warrant an anal-
ysis focusing specifically upon protecting the right of petition.
A. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Flows from the First
Amendment Right of Petition
Some commentators question whether the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine flows from the First Amendment, a construction of the Sherman
Act, or a combination of the two.326 However, Judge Cudahy's opin-
ion views the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as the offspring of the First
Amendment. 327 "Noerr-Pennington immunity recognizes both the
reach of the First Amendment right to petition and the limited ability
323. Id. at 796 n.6.
324. Id.
325. Justice Rutledge used the term in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); supra
notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press
were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble
and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are insepara-
ble. They are cognate rights ....
Id. at 530 (internal citations omitted). Justice Rutledge did note that the rights were not "identi-
cal." Id. Subsequent decisions have perhaps lost sight of Justice Rutledge's observation. See
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985); supra notes 156-62. "These First Amendment
rights are inseparable and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to
statements made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions." Id.
(emphasis added and internal citations omitted). "The right to petition is cut from the same
cloth as the other guarantees of that Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of
expression." Id. at 482.
326. ABA ANTITRUST SECT ION, MONOGRAPH No. 19, The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 34
(1993).
327. 188 F.3d at 795.
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of Congress to fetter that right. '328 The question is important because
if the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is based primarily on First Amend-
ment principles, then courts must look to case law interpreting the
First Amendment and the right of petition when applying the doc-
trine.329 If the doctrine is based primarily on the Sherman Act, then
courts must look to the body of antitrust law.330 Obviously, if the No-
err-Pennington doctrine is based on a construction of the Sherman
Act, then its extension beyond antitrust law becomes more difficult to
justify.
The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly stated the
basis for the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.33' In Noerr, however, the
Court clearly indicated that constitutional concerns were at least one
significant basis for its holding.332 "The right of petition is one of the
freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course,
lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms. '333
One commentator has suggested that the Court's repeated references
to "immunity" in the more recent case of Allied Tube & Conduit Cor-
poration v. Indian Head, Inc. ,334 which "implies that the doctrine's
constitutional roots are preeminent. '335
The lower courts that have extended Noerr-Pennington immunity
beyond antitrust have consistently articulated a constitutional ratio-
nale for such a holding. 336 For example, in Gorman Towers, Inc. v.
Bogoslavsky, the court reasoned that the United States Supreme
Court in Noerr "relied in large part on the desirability of avoiding the
'important constitutional questions' that would arise if it imputed to
Congress an intent to regulate activity covered by the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. ' 337 Thus, the Gorman Towers court used "deference to
the right to petition" to support its extension of Noerr-Pennington im-
munity to section 1983 cases. 338
The position that constitutional law provides the foundation for the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine receives its fullest support in recognizing
328. Id.
329. See supra note 327, at 35.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 34-38.
332. 365 U.S. 127 at 138.
333. id.
334. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
335. See supra note 327, at 35 n.207 (citing Calkins, Developments in Antitrust and the First
Amendment: The Disaggregation of Noerr, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 346 (1988)).
336. See supra notes 207-67 and accompanying text.
337. 626 F.2d at 607.
338. Id.
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that the application of the same reasoning employed in the Noerr and
Pennington cases can protect the right of petition without specifically
invoking either case. In Aknin and Sawmill Towers, for example, the
right of petition immunized the defendants' conduct in the face of sec-
tion 1983 actions, but the court in each of those cases made no men-
tion of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.3 39 It would appear that the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine is a shorthand representation of the princi-
ple expressed in Tarpley, and other cases, that "parties may petition
the government for official action favorable to their interests without
fear of suit, even if the result of the petition, if granted, might harm
the interests of others. '340 The Constitution, specifically the First
Amendment right of petition, drives the result in Noerr and its prog-
eny. It is "deference to the right to petition, ' 341 not the talismanic
quality of the term "Noerr-Pennington," that is the unifying principle
of the Noerr line of cases. Again, Tarpley is fully in accord. "This so-
called Noerr-Pennington immunity recognizes both the reach of the
First Amendment right to petition and the limited ability of Congress
to fetter that right. '342
Tarpley follows the basic principle that Noerr-Pennington immunity
represents that expression-which otherwise may be impermissible
and actionable-can be protected in certain circumstances if it is
made in the form of a petition. Similar to how the defendants' actions
in Noerr and Pennington might have amounted to impermissible viola-
tions of the antitrust laws had those actions not been in the form of
petitions, Keistler's actions may have constituted an impermissible re-
striction of Tarpley's freedom of political association. The question
remains whether the right of petition embraces political patronage
recommendations, such as the one made by Keistler.
B. The Right of Petition Embraces Political
Patronage Recommendations
Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in the first half of the Nineteenth
Century, stated that political "[p]arties are a necessary evil in free
339. See supra notes 215-23 (discussing Aknin v. Phillips and Sawmill Prod., Inc. v. Town of
Cicero).
340. 188 F.3d at 794. Although the position that the First Amendment foundations of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine can be supported without reference to the Noerr and Pennington
cases themselves it might make the Noerr-Pennington doctrine a somewhat misplaced analogy
for First Amendment petition rights, but a review of the cases and their progeny is still useful.
Many of the cases that extend protection to petitions cite and discuss the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine as justification for their holdings. See supra notes 163-267 and accompanying text.
341. 626 F.2d at 614.
342. 188 F.3d at 794.
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governments. ... -1343 Inevitably, Tocqueville continued, political par-
ties and politicians will seek to advance their own interests.
A political aspirant in the United States begins by discriminating his
own interest, and by calculating upon those interests which may be
collected around and amalgamated with it; he then contrives to dis-
cover some doctrine or some principle which may suit the purposes
of this new association, and which he adopts in order to bring for-
ward his party and to secure his popularity .... 344
Not only are political parties a "necessary evil," and their pursuit of
self-interest inevitable, "the right of political association is integral to
republican government. '345 Group association enhances the advocacy
of both private and public matters, particularly those that are contro-
versial. Thus, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a con-
stitutional right of political association. 346
As Tarpley illustrates, the right of association does not occur in a
vacuum, nor is it an end in itself.3 47 "People who associate, especially
those who enter the political fray, have grander, even if selfish, aspira-
tions: they want to speak, assemble, petition or publish in support of
something."348 An individual such as Tarpley does not join the Demo-
cratic Party just to carry a membership card or otherwise proclaim his
affiliation, but rather to support something.349 Justice Douglas made a
similar argument in his concurring opinion in Gibson v. Florida Legis-
lative Investigative Committee,350 "[j]oining a group is often as vital to
freedom of expression as utterance itself."'351
Of course, Tarpley has associational rights, including the right to
belong to a political party of his own choosing and not be penalized by
the government for that choice. Tarpley's choice of party in effect cost
343. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 173-74 (1889). Tocqueville also
lamented the dearth of "great" political parties.
The political parties which I style great are those which cling to principles more than to
their consequences; to general, and not to especial cases; to ideas, and not to men.
These parties are usually distinguished by a nobler character, by more generous pas-
sions, more genuine convictions, and a more bold and open conduct than the others. In
them private interest, which always plays the chief part in political passions, is more
studiously veiled under the pretext of public good; and it may even be sometimes con-
cealed from the eyes of the very persons whom it excites and impels.
Id. at 174. He continued "America has already lost the great parties which once divided the
nation ..... Id.
344. Id. at 177.
345. 188 F.3d at 796 n.6.
346. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. 372 U.S. at 565 (Douglas, J., concurring). See supra notes 145-155.
351. Id.
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him his job because his was the losing party. This was a restriction on
his freedom of belief and association. The consequences to Tarpley
were much the same as those described by Justice Brennan in Elrod v.
Burns.352
An individual who is a member of the out-party maintains affilia-
tion with his own party at the risk of losing his job [or being denied
employment as was the case with Tarpley]. He works for the elec-
tion of his party's candidates and espouses its policies at the same
risk. The financial and campaign assistance that he is induced to
provide to another party furthers the advancement of that party's
policies to the detriment of his own party's views and ultimately his
own beliefs, and any assessment of his salary is tantamount to co-
erced belief. Even a pledge of allegiance to another party, however
ostensible, only serves to compromise the individual's true beliefs.
Since the average public employee is hardly in the financial position
to support his party and another, or to lend his time to two parties,
the individual's ability to act according to his beliefs and to associate
with others of his political persuasion is constrained, and support for
his party is diminished. 353
Unquestionably, "[t]hese are significant penalties and are imposed
for the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. ' 354
However, Tarpley's right of association was not circumscribed simply
because his party lost the election. Tarpley's right of association was
circumscribed in large measure because it collided with another pri-
vate individual's own First Amendment rights, in particular, that indi-
vidual's right of petition. 355 When a private individual, who is also an
employee of a non-governmental political party organization, recom-
mends the hiring of an individual of the same party for a government
position, he is asking the government for action favorable to his inter-
ests. Therefore, he is exercising his right of petition.35 6 In one sense
the party worker's actions may appear ignoble. Political patronage
usually carries the stigma of corruption,35 7 a problem which Judge
Cudahy's opinion acknowledged by characterizing Keistler as an "old-
timer," whose actions were "suspicious. ' 358 Yet, in a two-party sys-
352. 427 U.S. at 355.
353. Id. at 355-56 (internal citations omitted).
354. 497 U.S. at 74.
355. 188 F.3d at 796 n.6. Judge Cudahy points out that "Tarpley's right to associate is not
circumscribed because his is the losing party; party choice has nothing to do with it." Id. Obvi-
ously, being on the losing side does have something to do with it because if Tarpley had been a
Republican he might have received the job. The more significant issue is how to settle the asser-
tion of mutually exclusive First Amendment claims by private parties. Id.
356. Id. at 795.
357. See generally Bowman, supra note 3 (discussing how patronage works).
358. 188 F.3d at 795, 796 n.8.
TARPLEY v. KEISTLER
tem, politics is often untidy and venal.359 Keistler's actions in recom-
mending Blessing were an exercise of a "paradigmatic First
Amendment right," not only because "[m]aking suggestions about
whom to hire is a traditional form of political activity, '360 but because
getting jobs for party loyalists helps propagate a two-party system. A
two party system, in the opinion of commentators such as Thomas
Jefferson and Alexis de Tocqueville, is necessary for a free society.
361
Keistler's actions were as anticompetitive as the actions of the defend-
ants in the Noerr and Pennington cases, however, this was irrelevant.
An individual's motives may be selfish or partisan because
"[a]dvocacy is inherently partisan, and the First Amendment guaran-
tees freedom of such partisanship, at least in the form of political
speech. '362 Without partisanship there can be no political parties, and
without political parties, if Jefferson and Tocqueville are to be be-
lieved, there can be no free society.363
The Tarpley decision protects the right of political association by
subordinating it to the right of petition. 364 As Judge Cudahy noted,
"the right of political association comprises (and is derivative of) the
textual First Amendment rights-speech, assembly, petition and
press-only by protecting the scope of the component parts (here, peti-
tion and speech) can we protect the amalgam." 365 A section 1983 ac-
tion, the decision continued, is an improper means for restricting a
traditional political activity such as the attempt to persuade public of-
ficials.366 "[F]ar from belittling the right to political association, "the
court believed it was enhancing its vibrancy. '367 Keistler's First
Amendment right of petition trumps Tarpley's associational rights.
No balancing was done. Vindicating Keistler's right of petition at the
expense of Tarpley's associational rights ultimately protects the associ-
ational rights of all, including Tarpley. "[E]ffective advocacy of both
public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is
undeniably enhanced by group association. ' 368 Thus, protecting
359. See supra notes 14, 23, 344-45.
360. 188 F.3d at 795.
361. See supra notes 14, 344-45.
362. 188 F.3d at 795.
363. See supra notes 14, 344-45. Of course, the necessity of political parties and their value in
a free society is debatable, with Jefferson and Tocqueville perhaps representing one extreme of
opinion. The Federalists believed differently. See, e.g., THE FEDERALISTr Nos. 9, 10 (Alexander
Hamilton) (discussing the problems of faction and the proposed Constitution as the remedy).
364. 188 F.3d at 795.
365. Id. at 796 n.6.
366. Id. at 796.
367. Id. at 796 n.6.
368. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
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Keistler's right of petition today benefits Tarpley's chances of one day
gaining the recommendation of a non-governmental Democratic Party
officer for another government job when his party is again on the win-
ning side.369
Keistler and other similarly situated individuals, who are private po-
litical party officers, have an affirmative First Amendment right of pe-
titioning the government in a form of political advocacy to seek action
favorable to their interests. In contrast, Tarpley and other similarly
situated individuals have no comparable affirmative constitutional
right to government jobs.370 Ordinarily, the government has no af-
firmative duty to protect an individual from harm caused to him by
another private individual, 37' unless the other individual's actions can,
in some way, be attributed to the state.372 Admittedly, Tarpley did
have a right not to be denied the government job at Choate Mental
Health Center because of his political affiliation. However, Keistler, a
private individual, can only be held accountable if his actions cannot
properly be characterized as a petition. Keistler's recommendation of
a party loyalist for a government job did not amount to a constitution-
ally impermissible denial of Tarpley's associational rights because the
recommendation was a petition in the form of political advocacy. 373
Judge Cudahy's decision could omit the "difficult determination" of
state action because the political advocacy practiced by Keistler did
not amount to an impermissible act, even though Tarpley sought to
mischaracterize Keistler's actions as a conspiracy. 374 Tarpley's harm
was merely collateral to Keistler's intended result of advocating Re-
publican loyalists for the position. 375 Judge Cudahy acknowledged
that if Keistler, in conjunction with the state, attempted to harm Tarp-
369. Patronage obviously can entrench one party thereby weakening the two-party system, as
Tammany Hall in Nineteenth Century New York City and the supremacy of the Democratic
Party in Chicago since 1931, demonstrate. See Bowman supra note 3, at 85. Nevertheless, pri-
vate political partisans must be "free to advocate" if the right of political association is to have
any meaning. 188 F.3d at 796 n.6.
370. One is reminded a little of Justice Holmes' observation that "[tihe petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAu-
liffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
371. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. RoiUNDA, CONSTI-rUIONAL LAW 477 (4th ed. 1991).
372. Id. at 477.
373. 188 F.3d at 795.
374. Id. As Professors Nowak and Rotunda note "a ruling on the presence of state action is a
decision on the merits of the underlying constitutional claim .... The [fourteenth] amendment
does not require the judiciary to determine whether a state has 'acted,' but whether a state has
'deprived' someone of a guaranteed right." See NOWAK AND RorUNDA supra note 372, at 484.
By declining to reach the determination of state action the decision signals that there has not
been a state deprivation of a constitutional right.
375. 188 F.3d at 795.
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ley personally by recommending someone else for the Choate job,
then First Amendment protections might not have applied. 376 Such
actions would have amounted to an impermissible conspiracy, not sim-
ple political advocacy. In the absence of a conspiracy directed at an
individual, Keistler's right to petition the government to hire a party
loyalist is more valuable than Tarpley's right to be considered for a
government job, regardless of his party affiliation, because "[p]olitical
association would be an empty right indeed if partisans were not free
to advocate. '377
C. The Right of Petition is Unique and Distinct from Other
Enumerated Rights
As we have seen, a line of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century peti-
tion cases culminating in the Noerr and Pennington cases, and their
progeny, establish that the right of petition protects a citizen's right of
access to his government, and as a result, immunizes expression which
might otherwise be actionable.378 The McDonald decision, while lim-
iting the right of petition, holds that the right "is an assurance of a
particular freedom of expression. '379 Implicit in this statement is an
understanding that the right of petition is distinct from the rights of
speech, press, and assembly. However, later opinions acknowledging
the point established by McDonald lose sight of what is distinct about
the right of petition.380 For example, in San Filippo v. Bongiovanni,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that
"McDonald is a case in which the petition clause protects no value
that is not protected by the speech clause. ' 381 The Third Circuit found
it "difficult to distinguish in any meaningful way between words con-
tained in a letter to the President and words contained in, for exam-
ple, an advertisement appearing in the New York Times."' 382 Yet, a
meaningful distinction may exist when expression is immunized be-
cause a private individual or group presents its expression in the form
of a petition, that is, a request to the government for action favorable
to its interests. Moreover, the right of petition also protects the indi-
376. Id. at 796. "Other contexts may dictate different results, and First Amendment protec-
tions would not necessarily extend to cases where the attempt itself (rather than the intended
result) created the alleged harm." Id. The determination of state action depends on the facts of
each case. Id. See supra note 372, at 483.
377. Id. at 796 n.6.
378. See supra notes 117-267 and accompanying text.
379. 472 U.S. at 482.
380. San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 442-43 (3rd Cir. 1994).
381. Id. at 439.
382. Id.
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vidual petitioner's freedom to choose not only the content of his peti-
tion and its recipient, but also the means of expressing his petition.383
It is for the petitioner to decide how his petition can most effectively
be brought to the attention of its intended recipient.38 4 The petitioner
may choose unwisely, but the decision is his to make. The petitioner
"is not limited to writing a letter or sending a telegram to a congress-
man; [the right of petition] is not confined to appearing before the
local city council, or writing letters to the President or Governor or
Mayor. '38 5 A petitioner's methods of petitioning need not be "con-
ventional" because
[c]onventional methods of petitioning may be, and often have been,
shut off to large groups of our citizens. Legislators may turn deaf
ears; formal complaints may be routed endlessly through a bureau-
cratic maze; courts may let the wheels of justice grind very slowly.
Those who do not control television and radio, those who cannot
afford to advertise in newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets
may have only a more limited type of access to public officials. 386
In short, "the Petition Clause embraces a much broader range of com-
munications addressed to the executive, the legislature, courts and ad-
ministrative agencies. ' '3 7 The petitioning method chosen may be seen
simply as another example of freedom of expression in general, and
therefore subject to many of the same restrictions on time, place, and
manner as non-petitionary expression. The recognition that "uncon-
ventional" communications may qualify as petitions has helped add in
the expansion of immunized expression that has potential to be
immunized.
Tarpley v. Keistler recognizes that the right of petition embraces a
variety of topics and may be expressed through different means or in
different forms. The decision stands for the proposition that a petition
expressed through non-traditional means is not rendered impermissi-
383. See AIBRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES, supra note 104, at 141. See also supra notes 102-
266 and accompanying text.
384. Judicial petitions are another form of petitioning. See Andrews, supra note 110, at 633.
If an individual, returning from a political rally in which he exercised his freedoms of speech,
press, and assembly found a parking ticket on the windshield and chose to contest the ticket, he
would be asserting another form of his right of petition. He would be directly targeting that
agency within the government he believes best able to provide relief, but his petition would not
involve freedom of assembly, press, or except by the most attenuated construction speech. Of
course the assertion of the enumerated rights in any combination or form is no guarantee of
success. One can wonder whether a municipal authority charged with enforcement of parking
violations is likely to be moved by an exercise of the right of petition.
385. 385 U.S. 39, 49-50 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
386. Id.
387. 472 U.S. 479, 488 n.2.
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ble simply because it is expressed through non-traditional means.388
In Tarpley, as we have seen, a private individual employed as an of-
ficer of a county political party organization recommended the hiring
of a party loyalist to a state government personnel officer in a tele-
phone conversation.389 The decision noted that the defendant's ac-
tions might be protected by the free speech clause of the First
Amendment,390 but went on to hold that the act of recommending was
an example of the right of petition because Keistler was asking the
government for action favorable to his interests. 391 Keistler chose the
means through which to submit his petition, the telephone, and the
individual to whom to submit his petition, Natalie Bales. 392
The dissent concluded that had Keistler written a letter to Ms.
Bales, or organized a "massive letter writing campaign among his fel-
low party members," his actions would have been protected under the
First Amendment.393 This is not necessarily true. Judge Ripple's dis-
sent confused the means and form of a petition with evidence of an
impermissible conspiracy. Under the dissent's analysis, traditional
methods of petitioning, such as letters, presumably would not qualify
as evidence of an impermissible conspiracy. However, the dissent
failed to appreciate that one value of the right of petition lies precisely
in the discretion it gives a petitioner to choose both the means and the
recipient of his petition. As the majority observed, "[s]imply because
Keistler was 'engaged in an old-time political activity' does not re-
quire that his methods of advocacy be similarly old-fashioned. 394
Therefore, the dispositive issue in Tarpley was not the form or means
of the petition, as the dissent suggests, but rather Keistler's actions.
Assuming, in conjunction with the state, Keistler was somehow "out
to get" Tarpley personally by depriving him of the Choate job,
Keistler's actions could be characterized as a conspiracy and made ac-
tionable.395 However, if this were the case, it would not make any
difference whether Keistler sent one letter, many letters, or spoke on
a telephone. On the other hand, if Tarpley's loss of the Choate job
was merely collateral to Keistler's general efforts to advance the inter-
ests of his party, then there was no impermissible conspiracy, but
388. 188 F.3d at 797 n.8.
389. Id. at 790.
390. Id. at 794.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 790.
393. Id. at 797 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
394. 188 F.3d at 796 n.8 (internal citations omitted).
395. Id.
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rather political advocacy. 396 Again, Keistler's choice of means or form
would have not have transformed permissible political advocacy into
impermissible conspiracy.
V. IMPACT
In handing down its decision in Tarpley, the Seventh Circuit joined
the other Circuits that have expressly extended Noerr-Pennington im-
munity to bar section 1983 actions. At the close of his dissent, Judge
Ripple lamented that the decision in Tarpley will "haunt the jurispru-
dence of this circuit. '397 Although it is too early to assess the influ-
ence of Tarpley on the jurisprudence of the Seventh Circuit, Judge
Ripple's fears should prove unfounded. Tarpley v. Keistler, as many
First Amendment cases before it, does demand a choice between the
competing First Amendment rights of two individuals.398 Judge
Cudahy's opinion declined to "vindicate [Tarpley's] First Amendment
rights at the expense of Keistler's . . ." because "[s]ection 1983 claims
... are not appropriate vehicles for proscribing traditional political
activity such as attempts to persuade public officials. '399 It is unlikely
that Tarpley will lead to an increased application of the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine to defeat meritorious section 1983 claims. The opin-
ion acknowledges that when political advocacy is not involved, or
there is an attempt to personally harm a particular individual, then the
outcome could be different. 400 In addition, Tarpley should not loosen
the restrictions against political patronage hiring established by the
396. Id. at 795. The dissent equates the majority's acknowledgement that there was some
evidence from which a jury could have concluded a conspiracy existed to indicate that there was
a material issue of fact and therefore, that summary judgment should have been denied. id. at
797 (Ripple, J., dissenting). Arguably, the dissent takes this acknowledgment out of context. In
the paragraph following the acknowledgement that there was some evidence of a conspiracy, the
opinion makes the point that what Tarpley mischaracterized as a conspiracy was political advo-
cacy. Id. at 795. The evidence recited in the preceding acknowledgement paragraph was there-
fore evidence of political advocacy, not conspiracy, and therefore did not create state action. Id.
The point is a fine one, but if the court believes there is no "genuine issue as to any material
fact" then the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Appar-
ently, neither the district court nor a majority of the appellate panel believed there was an issue
of material fact regarding Tarpley's mischaracterization of political advocacy as conspiracy. 188
F.3d at 791 (citing appellant's position).
397. Id. at 798.
398. 188 F.3d at 796 n.7.
399. Id. at 796.
400. Id. Here, the alleged harm to Tarpley occurred indirectly because the job at the Choate
Mental Health Center went to another individual. Id. at 795. Keistler's "intended result" was to
recommend a Republican party loyalist for the job in the expectation that his recommendation
would be accepted. Id. Of course, the job might have gone to another Republican loyalist on
the basis of another party officer's recommendation if another Republican been nominated.
However, had Keistler deliberately targeted Tarpley for exclusion from the job and recom-
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line of cases from Elrod through Rutan because those cases dealt with
defendants who were government employees, not private individu-
als. 40 1 In each of those cases, the state action requirement was already
met, therefore, questions of whether political advocacy amounted to
impermissible conspiracies between state and private actors did not
have to be considered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although Tarpley v. Keistler extended Noerr-Pennington immunity
to section 1983 actions, the larger significance of the decision lies in its
recognition of the value in the right of petition and in its understand-
ing of what distinguishes the right of petition from the other enumer-
ated rights of speech, press, and assembly. The freedom of speech,
press, and assembly will often embrace the right of petition. In such a
situation, the analysis should take direction from any principles of
constitutional law applicable to freedom of expression. From time to
time, as in the Noerr-Pennington line of cases and in Tarpley, the right
of petition itself, that is, the right of an individual to request action
from the branch of the government he believes best able to help him
and to make his request in a form he believes most effective, is chal-
lenged apart from the other enumerated rights. In such a situation,
courts should recognize, as the majority opinion in Tarpley did, that
the right of petition merits a separate analysis. Not only must the con-
tent of the petition be carefully examined, but also the form in which
the petition is made and the means by which it is presented. If a com-
munication can be properly characterized as a petition, it may merit
some measure of protection even though its content might otherwise
be actionable. The content of the communication should not be the
only consideration because unconventional or less traditional methods
of petitioning may obscure what is a legitimate request for govern-
ment action. Unconventional or less traditional methods of petition-
ing are sometimes necessary. 40 2 The form and means of a petition
may prove just as decisive as the petition's content in achieving its
intended result. Judge Cudahy's opinion understands that sometimes
the means or form of the petition is a part of the message. 40 3 In ex-
mended Blessing specifically to thwart Tarpley, then his attempt would have created the harm
and would not be protected. id. at 797 n.8.
401. See supra 385.
402. See supra notes 31-77 and accompanying text.
403. "In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things as a means of
control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be reminded that, in operational and practical fact, the
medium is the message." MARSHALL McLUHAN. UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE ExI-ENSIONS OF
MAN, 7 (1964) (emphasis added).
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tending Noerr-Pennington immunity to a form of political advocacy in
the context of a section 1983 claim, Tarpley v. Keistler appropriately
protects the First Amendment right of petition.
James Filkins
